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Abstract
Consumers frequently face mismatch risk as goods they purchase may be deemed inap-
propriate or below expectations. Due to this risk, consumers may avoid purchasing such
goods and consequently hurt retailers. Can the emergence of peer-to-peer (P2P) market-
places benefit retailers? On the one hand, P2P marketplaces can mitigate some of this risk
by allowing consumers to trade mismatched goods. On the other hand, P2P marketplaces
impose a threat on retailers as they compete with them over consumers. We develop a
two-period model that highlights the effects introduced by P2P marketplaces.
We show that a P2P marketplace benefits both the retailer and consumers when the
wholesale price is sufficiently high and hurts them both when the wholesale price is low.
The introduction of a P2P marketplace can relieve consumers from the mismatch risk and
induces the retailer to post a higher price. However, when the wholesale price is low,
the platform manages to extract most, or all, of the consumers surplus and directly hurts
consumers, and eventually the retailer who experiences lower sales in both periods. With
a high wholesale price the P2P marketplace is limited in its ability of extracting consumer
surplus, which increases the retailer sales and benefits both the retailer and consumers. We
further observe that social welfare is generally higher unless the wholesale price is relatively
low.
Keywords: mismatch risk, P2P marketplace, retailing strategy, backward induction.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
When consumers purchase goods, they frequently face risky decisions. After purchasing a
product, consumers may find that products do not meet their expectation and their utility
is diminished (Grewal et al., 1994; Teo and Yeong, 2003). This kind of concern can inhibit
potential consumers from buying products, and hence harm the retailer. This phenomenon
is particularly true for new goods as firms may intentionally limit the amount of information
released to consumers to induce more profits (Chu and Zhang, 2011). With the development
of the Internet and e-business (Bakos, 2001), consumers can trade with each other on peer-
to-peer (P2P) marketplaces like eBay, which offers a channel for consumers to dispose of
those products they do not want any more.
Obviously, to some extent, the emergence of P2P marketplaces relieves consumers’ con-
cern about product mismatch risk, especially for those forward-looking consumers who take
future payoff into consideration. As a result, more products will be sold when they are just
released, but in the future, new products will also face competition from used goods sold on
the P2P marketplaces. On the one hand, retailers can take advantage of the P2P platform
to lower consumers’ risk about mismatch. On the other hand, they need to compete with
the P2P platform. This leads us to explore several important research questions. Can,
and under what conditions, P2P marketplaces benefit or harm retailers in the presence of
mismatch risk? Additionally, how are consumers affected due to the emergence of P2P
marketplaces? Namely, can consumers materialize the benefits presented by P2P mar-
ketplaces, or are these benefits neutralized by the operators of these marketplaces and/or
retailers? Lastly, does a P2P marketplace induce a net social welfare gain? Specifically, is
this a “bigger slice or a larger pie” type of argument? Namely, a marketplace will emerge
if it can generate positive profit. Is this P2P profit merely a redistribution of wealth or
generation of new welfare?
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To study the implications of a P2P marketplace on the retailer, consumers and society,
in this paper, we consider a two-period setting in which a single retailer sells new products
to consumers. We start with a benchmark case in which there is no P2P marketplace.
The retailer sets optimal selling prices (quantities) over the two periods to maximize his
total profit. This analysis reveals the decisions made by the retailer as a function of the
wholesale price and the magnitude of mismatch risk faced by consumers. Since consumers
are forward-looking, they take into consideration the possibility that they will find the
product to mismatch their expectations after purchase.
We then incorporate an electronic P2P platform into the setting. The platform allows
consumers to salvage the mismatched products by selling them in the second period. The
platform generates revenue by charging consumers a fixed transaction fee, and the forward-
looking consumers now take into account the money they can recover by selling through
the platform when they consider buying the product. Importantly, we assume that in the
second period the uncertainty about the product’s valuation is eliminated and consumers
who face the buying decision in the second period face no mismatch risk. Both retailer and
platform operator optimize their decisions to maximize their respective profits. We derive
the equilibrium results in each of the scenarios by backward induction.
The analysis gives rise to several important insights. Our primary finding is that when
a P2P platform is involved, the retailer and consumers will benefit if the wholesale price is
sufficiently high, and vice verse. The intuition behind is that a P2P platform will induce
the retailers to increase the price of new products and may stimulate first period demand
by eliminating product mismatch risk, however, it also imposes competition that impairs
the retailer’s second period profit. When the wholesale price is low, the ratio of transaction
fee and used goods selling price is high, which means the platform extracts all or most of
the surplus form its consumers and hence reduces first period demand. As a result, the
retailer will not gain enough to compensate the loss from the competition brought by the
platform because of low first period demand. For the consumers, although they benefit
from an additional marketplace in the second period, the P2P platform will not compensate
their loss in the first period due to a higher retail price and relatively low salvage value.
Only when the wholesale price is sufficiently high, will the platform sufficiently compensate
consumers who may experience a product mismatch, and hence the benefit will outweigh
the potential harm of having a platform, making the retailer and consumers better off.
Interestingly, from society’s perspective, a P2P platform can harm total welfare when the
wholesale price is sufficiently low.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. §2 presents a review of related literature.
§3 describes the model framework. The benchmark case and the setting that accounts for
the presence of a platform are analyzed in §4. In §5, we further discuss the implications of
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the platform on the retailer and the consumers. Lastly, §6 concludes the paper.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
The related literature can be grouped into two main streams. One stream is related to the
emerging e-business and its marketplaces, while the other stream is related to retailers’
pricing strategies. We review each of these streams and other related papers below.
The first stream studies the impact of the rising e-marketplace on traditional retailing
industry. There are two main types of e-market intermediaries, one is usually referred to
as Business-to-Business/Business-to-Consumer (B2B/B2C) merchant who acquires goods
from suppliers and resells them to buyers, and the other is usually referred to as P2P
platform which allows its “affiliated” sellers to sell directly to its “affiliated” buyers. Hagiu
(2007) discusses several trade-offs between operating as a B2B or as a P2P, and has revealed
conditions under which the latter is preferred over the former.
The literature on B2B/B2C platforms has found many inspiring results. Choi et al.
(2004) argue that the introduction of the e-marketplace can be beneficial to the supply
chain and the amount of improvement depends on the fixed operational cost and the
demand size of the e-marketplace. Bernstein et al. (2008) note that when traditional
retailers use the Internet as a new selling channel in an oligopoly setting, the equilibrium
does not necessarily imply higher profits for the firms: in some cases, rather, it emerges
as a strategic necessity, and consumers are generally better off with clicks-and-mortar
retailers who incorporate Internet sales. Ghose et al. (2005) build a duopoly model to
examine conditions under which it is optimal for suppliers to operate in electronic used
goods markets in addition to brick-and-mortar channels, explaining why these markets may
not always be detrimental for them. They also highlight the strategic role that used goods
commission set by the retailer plays in determining profits for suppliers. Under a potential
revenue-sharing mechanism, Ryan et al. (2013) explore the interaction between a retailer
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only selling his products online and an e-marketplace like Amazon, addressing questions
such as whether the retailer should choose to contract with the online marketplace firm to
sell through the marketplace system, and if so, at what price; on the other hand, whether
the marketplace firm should sell a competing product, how to price that competing product,
and how to design a contract with the participating retailer.
As many other papers, we focus on one intermediary type: peer-to-peer, or P2P.
Whereas B2B/B2C platforms set their own prices for their products, P2P platforms give
rise to market clearance mechanisms. Yin et al. (2009) consider the interaction between two
behaviorally distinct used goods markets—retail and P2P—for a durable product. They
argue that compared to a no used goods market scenario, the presence of either retail or
P2P used goods market can be either beneficial or harmful for both channel members;
while in the presence of a retail used market, the addition of a P2P market is usually
beneficial for the retailer, but not when used products are valued highly by consumers.
Gumus et al. (2013) explore the role of consumer valuation for used products in shaping
the incentive of having a P2P used goods market. They show that higher consumer val-
uation of used goods in the P2P market increases the manufacturers’ incentive to offer a
returns policy contract to the retailer. From empirical aspect, Ghose et al. (2006) study
the elasticity of new product demand with respect to used product prices and the resulting
changes in new and used product sales and overall surplus. Their analysis suggests that
used books are poor substitutes for new books for most of Amazon’s consumers. Also,
the increase in book readership from Amazon’s used book marketplace increases consumer
surplus, decreases publisher welfare, and increases Amazon’s profits, which leads to an in-
crease in total society welfare from the introduction of used book markets at Amazon.com.
Most of the results in this stream are based on the assumption of a frictionless market,
however, using e-platforms in reality is not always free. Similar to Mantin et al. (2013),
our model incorporates a platform as a decision maker who charges a fixed transaction fee
to its consumers, and explores how the platform’s decision affects the retailer in such a
market setting.
The second related stream of research explores pricing strategies in the presence of
product quality risk; that is, when consumers may face a product mismatch. Hsiao and
Chen (2012) note that quality risk has an impact on a retailer’s return policy and pricing
strategy by investigating the interplay in a two-segment market setting distinguishing con-
sumers between having low valuation and high valuation. Gu and Liu (2013) argue that
better matching between consumers and products may hurt the retailer’s profit, in which
case the retailer cuts its own sales commissions and blocks manufacturer SPIFF (Sales
Person Incentive Funding Formula) programs so as to suppress retail sales advisory. In
e-business, retailers and consumers face not only product quality risk, but also mismatch
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risk due to information asymmetry. We believe mismatch risk plays an important role in
consumer behavior, but it is seldom considered in supply chain studies, hence we address
the role of mismatch risk in the interaction between a platform and a retailer in our model.
There are several other related streams addressing issues in supply chain management
based on a monopoly model setting. Bulow (1982), Huang et al. (2001), Gilbert et al.
(2012) explore trade-offs between selling and renting in traditional retail businesses using
a monopoly model. Altug (2012), Chen and Bell (2012) study one monopolistic retailer’s
optimal return policy. Li and Zhang (2013) focus on exploring sellers’ preorder strate-
gies. Inspired by these papers, we incorporate deterministic demand and forward-looking
consumers into our two-period monopoly model.
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Chapter 3
Modeling Framework
In this chapter, we describe our model setup and the methods to solve the model. We first
consider a benchmark scenario, where a single profit-maximizing retailer sells new products
to consumers over two periods in the absence of a platform. Similar to Yin et al. (2009), a
new set of consumers shows up in each period and their valuation v is uniformly distributed
between 0 and 1. Consumers face a mismatch risk: due to a variety of issues, not entirely
modeled in this paper, such as lack of information, consumers may find the good to be unfit
for their purposes. Consumers who are assumed to be forward looking, take this mismatch
risk into account. Specifically, as in Hsiao and Chen (2012), after some preliminary use,
with some probability α ∈ [0, 1], consumers find the product to be mismatched and hence
has no utility to them.1 We use αi ∈ {0, 1} to indicate consumer i’s mismatch realization,
where αi = 1 implies the product is a mismatch and hence the realized valuation of the
product is 0, and αi = 0 indicates a match and hence the entire valuation is materialized.
We also let α ∈ [0, 1] to represent the fraction of consumers having αi = 1. That is, α is
the expected mismatch risk faced by consumers. Since consumers are risk-neutral (as are
all other agents in our setting) and forward looking, they purchase the good only if their
expected utility, (1− α)v − p, where p denotes the price, is positive.
The sequence of events in the benchmark setting is depicted in Figure 3.1. In period 1,
the retailer orders an amount, qBR1n , of new products from a wholesaler at a cost w, and sets
the first period’s selling price pBR1n . We assume w < w¯ ≡ 1− α; otherwise, the retailer will
make negative profit in expectation, thus this is an individual rationality constraint and
1We assume that the goods, since they have already been used by consumers, cannot be returned
for a refund. In our follow-up research we also consider returns as a retailer’s strategy to combat P2P
marketplaces.
9
holds for all scenarios. w can be endogenized and becomes a decision variable. In that case
the results follow through, only that the implications would be at the supply chain level
rather than at the retailer level. In our setting, prices and quantities are equivalent: once
the quantity is determined, the price is set to sell out. Intuitively, due to the deterministic
nature of the model, since w > 0, the retailer will not purchase more units than it will
sell. After pBR1n has been announced, consumers buy products based on their expected
utility. At the end of period 1, individual mismatch, αi, is realized and all consumers with
mismatched products (αqBR1n ) get a negative utility,−pBR1n .
In period 2, a new set of consumers shows up. The retailer orders an amount, qBR2n , of
new products from a wholesaler at a fixed price, w, and sets the second period’s selling
price pBR2n .
2 Then, as before, consumers buy products based on their expected utilities.
To capture the effect of a profit-maximizing P2P platform, which allows used goods
transactions between consumers, on the retailer and the consumers, we consider a variation
to the benchmark scenario. In this augmented scenario, the retailer sells new products in
both periods, while used products are traded through the platform only in the second
period. The used goods sold on the platform are all mismatched goods from the first
period.
The stackelberg game sequence of events in the presence of a platform, which is shown
in Figure 3.1, is as follows. Following Mantin et al. (2013), in the first stage, the platform
commits to a fixed transaction fee t, the amount consumers are charged for using the
platform. For example, Amazon’s fees are posted online and are rarely changed. Then,
in the first period, the retailer orders an amount, qPR1n , of new products from a wholesaler
at a cost w per unit. This amout corresponds to the first period’s selling price pPR1n .
Then consumers buy products based on their expected utilities. At the end of period 1,
individual αis are realized and all consumers with mismatched products (αq
PR
1n ) wait to sell
their products through the P2P on-line market. Used products traded through the P2P
market are devalued by a factor δ ∈ [0, 1]. That is, the expected benefit of these products
is (1− α)δv.
In period 2, a new set of consumers shows up. The retailer sells qPR2n new products,
whereas qPP2p = αq
PR
1n used products are offered through the platform. Since used products
on the P2P platform are sold to clear the market, the corresponding prices of new and
used products may be determined, and are denoted as pPR2n and p
PP
2p respectively.
2We abstract away from the issue of strategic inventories and accordingly retailers have no reason to
store excess inventory. For more on strategic inventories, refer to Anand et al. (2008), Hartwig et al.
(2012).
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Platform commitment Period 1  Period 2  
   
 
q2p determined 
Retailer: q1n 
 𝛼𝑖 realized 
 
Timeline 
Platform: t 
Retailer: q2n 
 𝛼𝑖 realized 
Figure 3.1: Timeline of events: events that occur only in the presence of the platform are
with dashed arrows; non-decision events are in italic.
Next, we solve the model using backward induction for each of the two scenarios de-
scribed earlier. We start with the benchmark case (§4), and then proceed with the platform
setting (§5). Throughout the analysis, we use the following notation. Let the first super-
script denote the scenarios: B for the benchmark scenario, P for the platform scenario. Let
the second superscript denote the players: R for the retailer, and P for the platform. Let
the first subscript denote the periods: 1 for the first, and 2 for the second. Finally, let the
second subscript denote the types of products: n for the new products, and p for the used
products on the platform. Not all notations will have superscripts and subscripts present,
however, the meaning, given an order of these superscripts and subscripts, remains the
same. For example, pBR1n denotes the retailing price of a new product in the first period in
the benchmark scenario (see also Appendix A for the complete notation).
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Chapter 4
Model Analysis
We analyze the benchmark scenario and further the scenario incorporating a platform in
this chapter.
4.1 Benchmark scenario: no P2P platform
In this section, we explore the retailer’s equilibrium decisions and resulting profit in the
benchmark scenario without a P2P platform. In period 1, the expected utility from buying
a product is a consumer’s expected valuation of the product minus its selling price, that is,
UB1 = (1−α)v− pBR1n . The consumer indifferent between buying and not buying a product
in period 1 has a valuation of v¯B1 ≡ pBR1n /(1 − α). Then the quantity of products sold in
period 1 is given by qBR1n = 1− v¯B1 = 1− pBR1n /(1− α), which follows from the assumption
that consumers’ valuations are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1. Similarly, in period
2, we have qBR2n = 1− pBR2n /(1− α).
Having derived the demand functions, we can express the retailer’s profit functions. In
period 2, the profit of the retailer is given by ΠBR2 = (p
BR
2n −w)qBR2n = ((1− α)(1− qBR2n )−
w)qBR2n , which is concave in q
BR
2n . Maximizing Π
BR
2 with respect to q
BR
2n , we find that q
BR∗
2n =
(1−α−w)/(2(1−α)), pBR∗2n = (1−α+w)/2 and consequently ΠBR∗2 = (1−α−w)2/(4(1−α)).
Evidently, in this benchmark setting, the two periods are independent of each other. In
period 1, the profit of the retailer is given by ΠBR1 = (p
BR
1n − w)qBR1n . Therefore, the
total profit of the retailer is ΠBR = ΠBR1 + Π
BR∗
2 = ((1 − α)(1 − qBR1n ) − w)qBR1n + (1 −
α − w)2/(4(1 − α)), which is concave in qBR1n . Maximizing ΠBR with respect to qBR1n , we
find that qBR∗1n = q
BR∗
2n = (1 − α − w)/(2(1 − α)), pBR∗1n = pBR∗2n = (1 − α + w)/2 and
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ΠBR∗ = (1 − α − w)2/(2(1 − α)). Recall that we assume w < 1 − α, which guarantees
strictly positive quantities. The profit is decreasing in w, and decreasing in α. That is,
higher wholesale price and higher mismatch risk will harm the retailer’s profit.
In this benchmark scenario, there is no channel for consumers to trade their mismatched
products; hence they receive negative utility when a product mismatch occurs. This risk
is taken into account by consumers of which are all forward-looking in both the first and
second periods. In the next section we explore if a P2P platform can remedy the mismatch
issue.
4.2 A P2P platform scenario
In the presence of a platform, a consumer has the option of selling the product in the second
period at the market clearing price, pPP2p , while paying a cost t
PP to the platform for using
this service. Thus, in period 1, the expected utility from buying a product is a consumer’s
expected valuation of a product minus its selling price, plus his expected payoff from selling
the product through the platform, that is, UP1 = (1− α)v︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected valuation
− pPR1n︸︷︷︸
price
+α(pPP2p − tPP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected payoff
. A
consumer is indifferent between buying and not buying a product in period 1 when his
valuation of the product is v¯P1 = [p
PR
1n − α(pPP2p − tPP )]/(1− α). The indifference valuation
implies that the quantity of products sold in period 1 is qPR1n = 1 − v¯P1 = 1 − [pPR1n −
α(pPP2p − tPP )]/(1 − α). In period 2, the expected utility from buying a new product
is UP2 = (1 − α)v − pPR2n , whereas the expected utility of buying a used product from
the platform is UPp = (1 − α)δv − pPP2p . A consumer is indifferent between buying a
new product and a used product in period 2 if his valuation of the used P2P product is
v¯P2p = (p
PR
2n −pPP2p )/((1−δ)(1−α)), implying qPR2n = 1−v¯P2p = 1−(pPR2n −pPP2p )/((1−δ)(1−α)).
A consumer is indifferent between buying and not buying a used product from the platform
when his valuation of the used product is v¯p
P = pPP2p /(δ(1−α)), implying qPP2p = v¯P2p− v¯Pp =
(pPR2n − pPP2p )/((1− δ)(1− α))− pPP2p /(δ(1− α)). Having derived the demand functions, we
solve the game via backward induction.
We solve the Stackelberg game backwards by first maximizing the retailer’s total profit
in the two periods with respect to qPR1n and q
PR
2n . As the model is solved backwards, we find
a threshold of first period quantity due to nonnegative constraint on qPR2n , which leads to
two subgames: low qPR1n (such that q
PR
2n > 0) and high q
PR
1n (such that q
PR
2n = 0). Further,
by maximizing the platform’s profit with respect to tPP , subject to 0 ≤ tPP ≤ pPP2p under
low qPR1n case, we have two subgames: low t
PP (such that qPR1n > 0), and high t
PP (such that
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qPR1n = 0); and under high q
PR
1n case we have one subgame: low t
PP (such that qPR1n > 0). In
each subgame, the decision variables and profits of all agents are expressed in terms of α,
δ and w. Finally, we compare each subgame and derive the subgame perfect equilibrium
depending on the value of w (see Appendix B for details).
When a platform enters the market, it profits by charging a transaction fee to the
consumers who use the platform to sell their mismatched products. Let w1 ≡ 1 − α −
αδ(1−α)(2+α2δ−α2δ2)
2−3α2δ2+3α2δ−α3δ2+α3δ3 ; w2 ≡ 1− α− α
2δ2(1−α)
2+2α2δ−αδ−α2δ2 ; and w3 ≡ 1− α− α
2δ2(1−α)
2+2α2δ−αδ . We have
the following Lemma. All proofs are provided in Appendix B.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the platform sets the transaction fee, tPP , as follows:
(1) if the wholesale price is sufficiently low, w ≤ w1, then the platform transaction fee
is equal to the used product’s selling price (tPP∗ = pPP2p ) to extract all benefits from its
consumers;
(2) if w1 < w ≤ w2, then the transaction fee is lower than the used product’s selling
price (tPP∗ < pPP2p ) to induce more consumers to purchase in the first period;
(3) if w2 < w ≤ w3, then the platform sets the transaction fee to price the retailer out
of the second period (i.e., qPR2n = 0);
(4) if the wholesale price is sufficiently high, w > w3, the platform sets the transaction
fee as though it were a monopolist in the second period.
Formally,
tPP∗ =

δ(w(1+α−αδ)+(1−α)(1−α+αδ+α2δ−α2δ2))
2+α2δ−α2δ2 if w ≤ w1;
1−α−w+αδw
2α
if w1 < w ≤ w2;
w(1−αδ+α2δ)−(1−α)(1−αδ+α2δ−α2δ2)
α2δ
if w2 < w ≤ w3;
1−α−w+αδ(1−α)
2α
if w > w3.
The corresponding retailer’s decisions are given by:
{qPP∗1n , qPP∗2n } =

{ (1−α−w)(2−αδ)
2(1−α)(2+α2δ−α2δ2) ,
(1−α−w)(2+α2δ−2αδ)
2(1−α)(2+α2δ−α2δ2) } if w ≤ w1;
{ 1−α−w+αδw
4(1−α)(1+α2δ−α2δ2) ,
(1−α−w)(2+2α2δ−αδ−α2δ2)−(1−α)α2δ2
4(1−α)(1+α2δ−α2δ2) } if w1 < w ≤ w2;
{ 1−α−w
2αδ(1−α) , 0} if w2 < w ≤ w3;
{1−α−w+αδ(1−α)
(1−α)(1+α2δ) , 0} if w > w3.
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(b) retailer’s optimal decision variables
Figure 4.1: Decision variables in platform scenario, α = 0.8, δ = 0.9 [Note: α is inten-
tionally chosen to a high value to emphasize segment 3 and 4; however, even with lower α
values those segments exist as per Theorem 1.]
The optimal transaction fee and retailer’s corresponding decisions are demonstrated in
Figure 4.1. From the platform’s perspective, his profit is affected by the transaction fee
and the demand of new products in the first period, which in turn, determine the number
of used goods available in the second period. Therefore, the platform is trading-off between
setting a high transaction fee, referred to as the transaction fee effect, and having higher
first period demand, referred to as the demand effect, because a higher transaction fee
decreases the demand, and vice verse. Therefore, the optimal transaction fee is a result of
the interaction between the transaction fee effect and the demand effect.
Lemma 1 shows that when the wholesale price is sufficiently low, the platform can set
the transaction fee as high as possible, equal to the selling price of the used goods. In other
words, the transaction fee effect dominates the demand effect, and the platform has the
power to extract the entire surplus from consumers who use its service. As the wholesale
price increases, the transaction fee effect decreases while the demand effect increases, as
seen in segment 2 in Figure 4.1a, in which case the platform’s power is weakened. In
order to stimulate first period demand, the platform must reduce its transaction fee so as
to compensate consumers that may experience a mismatched product. As the wholesale
16
price continues to increase, the platform will induce the retailer to abandon his business in
the second period, as seen in segment 3 in Figure 4.1b. Therefore, the used goods on the
platform are the only goods sold in the market during the second period. The platform
may extract more of its consumers’ surplus, but not enough to extract the entire surplus
because the threat of the retailer selling new products in the second period. With the
wholesale price sufficiently high, w ≥ w3, this threat is eliminated and the first period
demand is very low due to the high retail price, consequently the platform needs to induce
demand in the first period by reducing the transaction fee as w further increases.
17

Chapter 5
The impact of a P2P platform
In this chapter we investigate the net effect of a P2P platform on retailers and consumers.
Consumers may sell mismatched products through the platform, however they must pay
a transaction fee to the platform operator. On the one hand, the mismatch risk can be
somewhat mitigated, as they can sell those unwanted products; while, on the other hand,
the retailer faces competition in the second period. Which of these effects dominates?
More specifically, how does the entrance of a P2P platform affect the retailer in terms of
retail price and profit? Is the retailer better off or worse off? How is the consumers’ surplus
affected? These questions are all explored in this section.
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 1. The introduction of a P2P platform
(1) reduces the expected profit of the retailer when the wholesale price is sufficiently low,
i.e., w < w˜ ≡ 1− α− αδ(1−α)(1−αδ+2
√
1+α2δ−α2δ2)
3+2αδ+4α2δ−5α2δ2 ∈ [w1, w2];
(2) increases the expected profit of the retailer when the wholesale price is sufficiently
high, i.e., w ≥ w˜.
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          retailer is worse off             retailer is better off   
         no business 
   
   
 ̃ 
   
 ̅ 
Figure 5.1: Wholesale price thresholds for retailer and consumers, δ = 0.9
Theorem 1 is demonstrated in Figure 5.1. From the retailer’s perspective, the emer-
gence of a P2P platform induces several effects. In the second period, the platform exposes
the retailer to competition from used products, which results in lower selling prices as
well as lower demand for new products (see Figure 5.2b), and hence lower profit in the
second period (see Figure 5.3a). At the same time, because the platform mitigates some
of the mismatch risk, the retailer can increase the selling price of new products in the first
period. However, higher selling price also has a negative effect on the first period demand.
As the wholesale price increases, w ≥ w1, the platform lowers the transaction fee to in-
crease consumers’ expected payoff to stimulate first period demand (the slope of qPR1n is less
steeper in segment 2 than that in segment 1 in Figure 5.2a). When the platform’s demand
stimulation effect dominates the negative effect of higher selling price, it results in greater
first period profit compared to the benchmark scenario (see segment 2 in Figure 5.3a).
As the wholesale price increases (w > w˜), the gain in the first period from benefit from
the platform exceeds the loss in the second period from the platform competition, which
leads to a net positive effect of the platform (see segment 2 in Figure 5.3b). In other
words, the advantage of a P2P platform is that it increases the price of new products and
may stimulate first period demand, but the disadvantage is that the competition impairs
the retailer’s profit. Only when the wholesale price is sufficiently high, will the benefit
compensate the potential harm of having a platform, making the retailer better off.
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Figure 5.2: Comparisons of retailer’s optimal decision variables between Benchmark and
Platform scenarios, α = 0.8, δ = 0.9
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(b) total profits
Figure 5.3: Comparisons of retailer’s optimal profit between Benchmark and Platform
scenarios: retailer’s profit, α = 0.8, δ = 0.9
Proposition 1. w¯−w˜
w¯
is increasing in α for all α ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 1 shows that the relative range (with respect to the range of feasible w)
of the retailer being better off with the platform is increasing in α. In other words, with
a given wholesale price, w, higher mismatch risk leads to higher likelihood of platform
benefiting the retailer. If the retailer could not prohibit the platform from entering the
market, he may want the products to have a mismatch risk as high as possible, α = 1−w,
which gives her the highest probability, 1, of benefiting from the introduction of a P2P
platform. However, higher α also reduces her profit in both scenarios, which means if the
retailer wants to negotiate with her wholesaler to increase the product mismatch risk to
give her a higher chance of benefiting from potential entrance of a P2P platform, he will
actually lose profit because of a higher product mismatch risk.
We also have the following insight regarding consumer surplus, which is the cumulative
integration of consumers’ net utility over the two periods. That is, the monetary gain
obtained by consumers for purchasing a product at a price less than the highest price that
they would be willing to pay.
Theorem 2. The introduction of a P2P platform
22
(1) decreases consumer surplus when the wholesale price is sufficiently low, w < w˜;
(2) increases consumer surplus when the wholesale price is sufficiently high, w ≥ w˜.
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(a) CS in period 1 and 2, respectively
 
                
                
Segment 1 Segment 4 Segment 3 Segment 2 
                     ̃     
(b) total CS
Figure 5.4: Comparisons between Benchmark and Platform scenarios: consumer surplus,
α = 0.8, δ = 0.9
This is an important insight. Although the perceived knowledge is that a P2P platform
always benefit consumers as it offers a channel to trade used goods and further pressure
retailers to lower prices, we find that this is not always true. In the presence of mismatch
risk, a platform allows consumers to recover some of the loss from the mismatch. However,
a platform can be detrimental to consumers’ welfare, when the wholesale price is low. For
example, w < w1, the platform sets the transaction fee equal to the selling price of the
online products, and consequently consumers do not gain anything by trading through the
platform. Even worse, they suffer from a higher price in the first period, which results in
a lower consumer surplus. When the transaction fee is lower than the selling price of the
used products on the platform, then consumers strictly gain from trading, yet the higher
first period price erodes these gains. It is only when the wholesale price is sufficiently high,
w > w˜, that consumers gain more from the presence of a platform as compared to the
benchmark scenario (see Figure 5.4).
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Lastly we consider the net effect on social welfare. Trivially, when the wholesale price is
high, a platform is welfare-imposing, as both the retailer and consumers are better off and
the platform makes positive profit. However, the two previous results reveal the erosion of
the retailer’s and the consumers’ welfare in the presence of a platform when the wholesale
price is low. Is it merely a gravitation of welfare from these two agents–the retailer and
the consumers–to the new agent–the platform? We have the following insight.
Observation 1. The introduction of a P2P platform
(1) reduces total welfare when the wholesale price is sufficiently low, w < wˆ;
(2) increases total welfare when the wholesale price is sufficiently high, w ≥ wˆ,
where wˆ is the threshold value that solves SW P −SWB ≡ ΠPP + ΠPR +CSP − (ΠBR +
CSB) = 0.
 
         social welfare is worse off    
         social welfare is better off   
         no business 
 ̂ 
 ̃ 
 ̅ 
Figure 5.5: Wholesale price thresholds for social welfare, δ = 0.6
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This observation indicates that a P2P platform is not always beneficial to society and is
shown in Figure 5.5. Specifically, when the wholesale price is sufficiently low, the emergence
of a P2P platform has a detrimental effect on social welfare. Figure 5.6, plots of the welfare
with a platform, which is ΠPP + ΠPR +CSP , and the welfare without a platform, which is
ΠBR+CSB, further illustrates this insight. When a product’s wholesale price is sufficiently
low, w < wˆ, both the retailer and the consumers suffer from the presence of a P2P platform
(∆ΠR ≡ ΠPR − ΠBR < 0,∆CSP ≡ CSP − CSB < 0), and the profit obtained by the
platform (∆ΠR ≡ ΠPR − 0 > 0) does not compensate for the loss of welfare of the retailer
and the consumers. Hence, social welfare diminishes as the platform enters the market.
 
                
                
 ̂      ̃     
               
               
               
                
                
                
Figure 5.6: Social welfare components, α = 0.8, δ = 0.9
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
The development of P2P platforms has changed traditional retailing. Our paper fills in the
academic literature gap by incorporating a P2P platform as a decision maker and taking
product mismatch risk into consideration at the same time. We show in this paper that
when product mismatch risk is present, a P2P platform can mitigate some of the risk by
allowing consumers to trade their used goods, however, at the same time, used goods on
the platform also compete with new goods from retailers. Specifically, our model shows
that a P2P platform can benefit both the retailer and consumers when the wholesale price
is sufficiently high. The intuition is that a P2P platform will increase the price of new
products and stimulates first period demand, but the competition it imposes will impair
the retailer’s second period profit. Only when the wholesale price is sufficiently high, will
the benefit compensate the potential harm of having a platform, making the retailer better
off. In terms of social welfare, a P2P platform can harm society, all agents in our model,
when the wholesale price is sufficiently low.
The results in this paper are based on a monopolistic model. In practice, there could
be multiple retailers offering identical or similar products and various P2P platforms can
co-exist. Accordingly, fiercer competition may arise along more complicated interactions
among market agents. A possible extension is to extend the present model to involve two or
more retailers and platforms. For instance, considering the competition between Microsoft
and Sony in the video-game industry, or Best Buy and Future Shop, it could be better
presented by a duopolistic or oligopolistic setting. However, we believe our core insights
still apply in such setting, and our work is a necessary fist step in analyzing these, more
complex, settings.
In addition, the wholesale price is exogenously given in our model for simplification.
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One possible extension is to incorporate a supplier as a decision maker, who maximizes
his profit over the wholesale price, which may change the wholesale price threshold in
this paper to a cost threshold related to the supplier. Also, because the supplier moves
before the retailer in the Stackelberg game, the resulting model may have two thresholds
when characterizing the benefits from the presence of a P2P platform, one is relative to
the supplier and the other is relative to the retailer, which may lead to a revenue-sharing
contract to benefit both the supplier and the retailer as a whole.
Last, but not least, one may consider the retailer applying platform-mitigation strate-
gies in order to improve his profit, such as buying out the platform, offering refunds,
revenue-sharing with the platform and so on. If any strategy is effective in increasing
retailer profitability is an open question and needs to be explored further. For example,
as shown in this paper, the platform can mitigate some of the mismatch risk, but also
impose competition. If the retailer buys out the platform and operates it by himself, he
may reduce some of the competition by suppressing first period demand, or go the other
way by stimulating the first period demand to earn more transaction fees. Either way, it
may help the retailer eliminate the threat of a P2P platform and boost his profit.
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Appendix A
Notations
α, probability of consumers observing a mismatch product, α ∈ [0, 1].
αi, individual realization of mismatch risk, αi ∈ {0, 1}.
δ, discount factor for used goods on the P2P platform.
w, wholesale price.
v, consumers valuation, v ∈ U [0, 1].
UB1 , U
B
2 , consumers’ expected utility from buying a new product in period 1 and 2 in
benchmark scenario, respectively.
UP1 , U
P
2 , consumers’ expected utility from buying a new product in period 1 and 2 in
platform scenario, respectively.
UPp , consumers’ expected utility from buying a used product in period 2 in platform sce-
nario.
pBR1n , p
BR
2n , selling price of new products in period 1 and 2 in benchmark scenario, respec-
tively.
qBR1n , q
BR
2n , demand of new products in period 1 and 2 in benchmark scenario, respectively.
pPR1n , p
PR
2n , selling price of new products in period 1 and 2 in platform scenario, respectively.
qPR1n , q
PR
2n , demand of new products in period 1 and 2 in platform scenario, respectively.
pPP2p , selling price of used products in period 2 in platform scenario.
qPP2p , demand of used products in period 2 in platform scenario.
tPP , platform transaction fee in platform scenario.
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ΠBR1 ,Π
BR
2 , retailer’s first and second period profit, respectively, in benchmark scenario.
ΠBR, retailer’s total profit in benchmark scenario.
ΠPR1 ,Π
PR
2 , retailer’s first and second period profit, respectively, in platform scenario.
ΠPR, retailer’s total profit in platform scenario.
CSB, consumer surplus in benchmark scenario.
CSP , consumer surplus in platform scenario.
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Appendix B
Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Using backward induction, we first solve for the retailer’s decisions in the two periods,
qPR1n , q
PR
2n , followed by the platform’s charge, t
PP . Specifically, the retailer sets (qPR1n , q
PR
2n )
to maximize his total profit
max
qPR1n ,q
PR
2n
ΠPR = (pPR1n − w)qPR1n + (pPR2n − w)qPR2n (B.1)
subject to qPR2n ≥ 0, (B.2)
qPR1n ≥ 0, (B.3)
where pPR1n = (1+αδ)(1−α)qPR1n −αδ(1−α)qPR2n −αtPP and pPR2n = (1−α)(1−αδqPR1n −qPR2n ).
The platform sets tPP to maximize its profit
max
tPP
ΠPP = αqPR1n t
PP (B.4)
subject to tPP ≥ 0, (B.5)
tPP ≤ pPP2p , (B.6)
where pPP2p = δ(1− α)(1− αqPR1n − qPR2n ).
ΠPR is jointly concave in (qPR1n , q
PR
2n ). Thus there exists an unconstrained unique global
optimal (qPR∗1n , q
PR∗
2n ). Instead of solving problems (B.1)–(B.3) and (B.4)–(B.6), we simplify
the retailer problem as problems (B.1)–(B.2) by including (B.3) into the platform problem.
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This means that for the retailer problem, we only have two cases, depending on whether
(B.2) is binding.
Solving problem (B.1)–(B.2) for qPR∗2n for a given q
PR
1n gives q
PR∗
2n = [((1 − α)(1 −
2αδqPR1n )−w)/(2(1−α))]+. Specifically, there exists a threshold q˜PR1n ≡ (1−α−w)/(2αδ(1−
α)), such that if qPR1n < q˜
PR
1n , then q
PR∗
2n = ((1−α)(1− 2αδqPR1n )−w)/(2(1−α)) > 0; other-
wise, if qPR1n ≥ q˜PR1n , then qPR∗2n = 0. The platform problem depends on whether constraint
(B.2) is binding or not. We have two cases.
Case 1: (B.2) is not binding. In this case, qPR1n < q˜
PR
1n and q
PR∗
2n = ((1 − α)(1 −
αδqPR1n ) − w)/(2(1 − α)) > 0. Solving problem (B.1)–(B.2) gives us the unconstrained
optimal qPR∗1n = (1 − α − w + αδw − αtPP )/(2(1 − α)(1 + α2δ − α2δ2)). Accordingly, we
rewrite the platform problem as:
max
tPP
ΠPP = αqPR1n t
PP (B.7)
subject to tPP ≥ 0, (B.8)
tPP ≤ pPP2p , (B.9)
qPR1n ≥ 0, (B.10)
qPR1n < q˜
PR
1n , (B.11)
where qPR1n = (1−α−w+αδw−αtPP )/(2(1−α)(1+α2δ−α2δ2)), which is the unconstrained
optimal solution to (B.1)–(B.2).
Rearranging (B.10) reveals an important threshold: t˜PP ≡ (1 − α − w + αδw)/α. If
tPP < t˜PP , then qPR∗1n = (1−α−w+αδw−αtPP )/(2(1−α)(1+α2δ−α2δ2)) > 0; otherwise,
if tPP ≥ t˜PP , qPR∗1n = 0. Thus for the modified platform problem, we have two subcases,
depending on whether (B.10) is binding or not.
Case 1.1: (B.10) is not binding. In this case, qPR∗1n = (1−α−w+αδw−αtPP )/(2(1−
α)(1 + α2δ − α2δ2)) > 0. Constraint (B.11) leads to tPP > tPP1 ≡ (w(1− αδ + α2δ)− (1−
α)(1−αδ+α2δ−α2δ2))/(α2δ). Constraint (B.9) leads to tPP ≤ tPP2 ≡ δ((1−α)(1 +αδ+
α2δ − α − α2δ2) + w(1 + α − αδ))/(2 + α2δ − α2δ2). Then we can rewrite the platform
problem as:
max
tPP
ΠPP = αt
PP (1−α−w+αδw−αtPP )
2(1−α)(1+α2δ−α2δ2) (B.12)
subject to tPP ≥ 0, (B.13)
tPP > tPP1 , (B.14)
tPP ≤ tPP2 . (B.15)
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(B.12) is concave in tPP . The unconstrained optimal tPP∗ = (1− α−w + αδw)/(2α) ≥ 0,
so (B.13) is always satisfied. Given this value of tPP , solving (B.15) gives us a threshold
of w: w1 ≡ 1−α−αδ(1−α)(2 +α2δ−α2δ2)/(2− 3α2δ2 + 3α2δ−α3δ2 +α3δ3), such that
if w ≤ w1, then the unconstrained optimal tPP∗ ≥ tPP2 ; if w > w1, then the unconstrained
optimal tPP∗ < tPP2 . The platform problem has two subcases depending on whether (B.15)
is binding or not.
Case 1.1a: (B.15) is binding. In this case, w ≤ w1 and tPP∗ = tPP2 = δ((1−α)(1 +αδ+
α2δ−α−α2δ2) +w(1 +α−αδ))/(2 +α2δ−α2δ2). Since w < 1−α, tPP2 > tPP1 . Therefore
(B.14) is always satisfied.
Case 1.1b: (B.15) is not binding. In this case, w > w1 and t
PP∗ = (1−α−w+αδw)/(2α).
Rewriting constraint (B.14) leads to w < w2 ≡ 1−α−α2δ2(1−α)/(2 + 2α2δ−α2δ2−αδ).
Since w2 > w1, only when w < w2 is case 1.1b feasible.
Case 1.2: (B.10) is binding. In this case, qPR∗1n = 0, which means there is no business
for both the retailer and the platform. So this subcase is a dominated strategy for the
platform.
Combining cases 1.1 and 1.2, we conclude that the platform prefers case 1.1, which is
a dominant strategy.
Case 2: (B.2) is binding. In this case, qPR1n ≥ q˜PR1n and qPR∗2n = 0. Solving problem
(B.1)–(B.2) gives us the unconstrained optimal qPR∗1n = ((1−α)(1+αδ)−w−αtPP )/(2(1−
α)(1 + α2δ)) ≥ q˜PR1n > 0. Therefore, (B.3) is always satisfied. Thus, qPR∗1n = ((1 − α)(1 +
αδ) − w − αtPP )/(2(1 − α)(1 + α2δ)). Accordingly, we can rewrite the platform problem
as:
max
tPP
ΠPP = αqPR1n t
PP (B.16)
subject to tPP ≥ 0, (B.17)
tPP ≤ pPP2p , (B.18)
qPR1n ≥ q˜PR1n , (B.19)
where qPR1n = ((1−α)(1 +αδ)−w−αtPP )/(2(1−α)(1 +α2δ)), which is the unconstrained
optimal solution to (B.1)–(B.2).
Rewriting constraint (B.19) leas to tPP ≤ tPP1 . Rearranging constraint (B.18) leads to
tPP ≤ tPP3 ≡ δ(αw+ (1−α)(2 + δα2−α))/(2 + δα2), and since w < 1−α, then tPP1 ≤ tPP3 ,
so (B.19) is stronger than (B.18), which means as long as (B.19) is satisfied, (B.18) is
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always satisfied. Then we can rewrite the platform problem as:
max
tPP
ΠPP = αt
PP ((1−α)(1+αδ)−w−αtPP )
2(1−α)(1+α2δ) (B.20)
subject to tPP ≥ 0, (B.21)
tPP ≤ tPP1 , (B.22)
(B.20) is concave in tPP . The unconstrained optimal tPP∗ = ((1−α)(1+αδ)−w)/(2α) >
0. Given this value of tPP , solving (B.22) reveals one threshold: w3 ≡ 1 − α − (1 −
α)α2δ2/(2 + 2α2δ − αδ), such that if w ≤ w3, then the unconstrained optimal tPP∗ ≥ tPP1 ;
otherwise if w > w3, then the unconstrained optimal t
PP∗ < tPP1 . Depending on whether
(B.22) is binding or not, we have two subcases.
Case 2a: (B.22) is binding. In this case, w ≤ w3 and tPP∗ = tPP1 = (w(1− αδ + α2δ)−
(1−α)(1−αδ+α2δ−α2δ2))/(α2δ). However, only when w ≥ w4 ≡ 1−α−(1−α)α2δ2/(1+
α2δ − αδ), tPP1 ≥ 0. Since w4 < w3, only when w4 ≤ w ≤ w3 is case 2a feasible.
Case 2b: (B.22) is not binding. In this case, w > w3 and t
PP∗ = ((1 − α)(1 + αδ) −
w)/(2α) < tPP1 . (B.21) is always satisfied.
Combining cases 1 and 2, we conclude that under case 1, when w ≤ w1, the platform
prefers subcase 1.1a; when w1 < w < w2, the platform prefers subcase 1.1b. Under case 2,
when w4 ≤ w ≤ w3, the platform prefers subcase 2a; when w > w3, the platform prefers
subcase 2b.
Since w1 < w4 < w2, when w < w4, the retailer chooses case 1; when w4 ≤ w < w2, the
retailer needs to compare his profit in case 1 and 2; when w ≥ w2, the retailer chooses case
2. Further we find that when w4 ≤ w < w2, the retailer’s profit in case 1 is greater than
that in case 2. Therefore, in general, when w < w2, the retailer prefers case 1; otherwise,
he prefers case 2.
B.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Denote ∆ as the retailer’s profit difference between benchmark scenario and platform
scenario, that is, ∆ = ΠBR∗ − ΠPR∗. We then consider ∆ in each of the ranges defined
earlier in Lemma 1.
When w < w1, ∆ is convex in w since
d∆2
d2w
= αδ(4−αδ−3α
3δ2+α3δ+2α3δ3+4α2δ−4α2δ2)
2(1−α)(2+α2δ−α2δ2)2 ≥ 0.
Also, when d∆/dw = 0, minimum ∆ = 0 is achieved at w = 1 − α ≥ w1. So ∆ is
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convexly decreasing when w < w1 and ∆ |w=w1= α
3δ3(4−αδ−3α3δ2+4α2δ−4α2δ2+α3δ)
4(2+3α2δ+α3δ3−3α2δ2−α3δ2)2 > 0 for all
0 ≤ α < 1.
When w1 ≤ w < w2, ∆ is convex in w since d∆2d2w = 3+2αδ+4α
2δ−5α2δ2
8(1−α)(1+α2δ−α2δ2) ≥ 0. Also
when ∆ = 0, w = w˜ or w˜′, where w˜ = 1 − α − αδ(1−α)(1−αδ+2
√
1+α2δ−α2δ2)
3+2αδ+4α2δ−5α2δ2 , w˜
′ = 1 − α +
αδ(1−α)(1−αδ+2√1+α2δ−α2δ2)
3+2αδ+4α2δ−5α2δ2 (w1 ≤ w˜ ≤ 1 − α ≤ w˜′). Therefore, w˜′ is infeasible because of
violation of individual rationality (w ≤ 1−α). Hence, if w ≤ w˜, ∆ ≥ 0; otherwise, ∆ < 0.
When w2 ≤ w < w3, ∆ is concave in w since d∆2d2w = 2α
2δ2−α2δ−1
2α2δ2(1−α) ≤ 0. Also, when
d∆/dw = 0, maximum ∆ = 0 is achieved at w = 1−α ≥ w3. So ∆ is concavely increasing
when w2 ≤ w < w3 and ∆ |w=w3= (1−α)(2α
2δ2−α2δ−1)
4(2+2δα2−αδ)2 < 0 for any 0 ≤ α < 1.
When w ≥ w3, ∆ is convex in w since d∆2d2w = 7+8α
2δ
8(1−α)(1+α2δ) ≥ 0. Also, when ∆ = 0,
w = 1 − α − αδ(1−α)(2
√
2+2α2δ+1)
7+8α2δ
≤ w3, or 1 − α + αδ(1−α)(2
√
2+2α2δ−1)
7+8α2δ
≥ 1 − α. Therefore,
∆ < 0 when w3 ≤ w ≤ 1− α.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Denote r as the likelihood of platform benefiting the retailer, that is r ≡ w¯−w˜
w¯
=
αδ(1−αδ+2
√
1+α2δ(1−δ))
3+2αδ+4α2δ−5α2δ2 .
dr
dα
=
δ((3+3α2δ2−6αδ−4α2δ)
√
1+α2δ(1−δ)+4α3δ2+4α2δ−4α3δ3+6−2α2δ2)√
1+α2δ(1−δ)(3+2αδ+4α2δ−5α2δ2)2 .
Note that δ(1 − δ) = 1
4
− (δ − 1
2
)2 ≤ 1
4
for all δ between 0 and 1 and α ≤ 1; hence
1 ≤√1 + α2δ(1− δ) ≤ √5
2
< 6
5
.
Therefore, (3+3α2δ2−6αδ−4α2δ)√1 + α2δ(1− δ)+4α3δ2+4α2δ−4α3δ3+6−2α2δ2) >
3+3α2δ2− 36αδ
5
− 24α2δ
5
+4α3δ2+4α2δ−4α3δ3+6−2α2δ2 = 9− 4αδ(9+α)
5
+α2δ2+4α3δ2(1−δ) >
9− 8αδ + α2δ2 + 4α3δ2(1− δ) > 0 for all α and δ between 0 and 1. Hence, dr
dα
> 0.
B.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Denote ∆ as the consumer surplus’s difference between benchmark scenario and platform
scenario, that is, ∆ = CSB − CSP , where CSB = ∫ 1
v¯B1
UB1 dv +
∫ 1
v¯B2
UB2 dv =
1
4
(1 − α −
39
2w−2αw−w2
1−α ), CS
P =
∫ 1
v¯P1
UP1 dv +
∫ v¯P2p
v¯Pp
UP2 dv +
∫ 1
v¯P2p
UPp dv=
(1+α2δ)(2−αδ)2(1−α−w)2+(1−α−w)2(2−2αδ+α2δ)(2+αδ+α2δ−2α2δ2)
8(1−α)(2+α2δ−α2δ2)2 if w ≤ w1;
(1+α2δ)(1−α−w+αδw)2+4(1−α−w)2(1+α2δ−α2δ2)2−α2δ2(1−α−w+αδw)2
32(1−α)(1+α2δ−α2δ2)2 if w1 < w ≤ w2;
(1+α2δ)(1−α−w)2
8α2δ2(1−α) if w2 < w ≤ w3;
(1−α−w+αδ−α2δ)2
32(1−α)(1+α2δ) if w > w3.
When w < w1, ∆ is convex in w since
d∆2
d2w
= αδ(4−αδ−3α
3δ2+α3δ+2α3δ3+4α2δ−4α2δ2)
4(1−α)(2+α2δ−α2δ2)2 ≥ 0.
Also, when d∆/dw = 0, minimum ∆ = 0 is achieved at w = 1 − α ≥ w1. So ∆ is
convexly decreasing when w < w1 and ∆ |w=w1= α
3δ3(4−αδ−3α3δ2+4α2δ−4α2δ2+α3δ)
8(2+3α2δ+α3δ3−3α2δ2−α3δ2)2 > 0 for all
0 ≤ α < 1.
When w1 ≤ w < w2, ∆ is convex in w since d∆2d2w = 3+2αδ+4α
2δ−5α2δ2
16(1−α)(1+α2δ−α2δ2) ≥ 0. Also
when ∆ = 0, w = w˜ or w˜′, where w˜ = 1 − α − αδ(1−α)(1−αδ+2
√
1+α2δ−α2δ2)
3+2αδ+4α2δ−5α2δ2 , w˜
′ = 1 − α +
αδ(1−α)(1−αδ+2√1+α2δ−α2δ2)
3+2αδ+4α2δ−5α2δ2 (w1 ≤ w˜ ≤ 1 − α ≤ w˜′). Therefore, w˜′ is infeasible because of
violation of individual rationality (w ≤ 1−α). Hence, if w ≤ w˜, ∆ ≥ 0; otherwise, ∆ < 0.
When w2 ≤ w < w3, ∆ is concave in w since d∆2d2w = 2α
2δ2−α2δ−1
4α2δ2(1−α) ≤ 0. Also, when
d∆/dw = 0, maximum ∆ = 0 is achieved at w = 1−α ≥ w3. So ∆ is concavely increasing
when w2 ≤ w < w3 and ∆ |w=w3= (1−α)(2α
2δ2−α2δ−1)
8(2+2δα2−αδ)2 < 0 for any 0 ≤ α < 1.
When w ≥ w3, ∆ is convex in w since d∆2d2w = 7+8α
2δ
16(1−α)(1+α2δ) ≥ 0. Also, when ∆ = 0,
w = 1 − α − αδ(1−α)(2
√
2+2α2δ+1)
7+8α2δ
≤ w3, or 1 − α + αδ(1−α)(2
√
2+2α2δ−1)
7+8α2δ
≥ 1 − α. Therefore,
∆ < 0 when w3 ≤ w ≤ 1− α.
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